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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Valentin Calvillo appeals from the conviction following jury trial of seven
counts of lewd conduct with a minor and one count of sexual abuse of a minor.
Specifically, Calvillo contends the state committed fundamental error in closing
argument by indirectly commenting on his right to remain silent during trial.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
C.v., the then 10 year old daughter of Calvillo's live-in girlfriend, disclosed
Calvillo had been having sexual contact with her. (PSI, pp.1-2.) Following an
investigation by law enforcement and a CARES interview (PSI, pp.2-3), the grand
jury indicted Calvillo on eight charges of lewd conduct with a minor and two
counts of sexual abuse of a minor. (R., pp.11-15.)
Calvillo proceeded to jury trial where his attorney outlined his case in
opening statement as a situation of he said-she said with no evidence aside from
the victim's word that Calvillo committed any crime.
p.284, L.10.)

(Supp. Tr., p.276, L.12 -

Calvillo's opening statement also made it clear to the jury that

Calvillo intended on testifying:
Valentin is going to take the stand, and he's going to look
you in the eyes, and he's going to say - I mean, I don't know how
strongly. He's going to be having a hard time to not just want to
reach out and say, "Listen to me. I didn't touch this girl. What can I
do to prove that? Other than to say I didn't do it?" Lack of
evidence. Jury Instruction 3.
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(Supp. Tr., p.281, Ls.14-21.) This point was reiterated when the jury was told
that after they heard from the victim and heard from Calvillo himself, it would
return a verdict of not guilty. (Supp. Tr., p.284, Ls.3-10.)
Calvillo was present for trial throughout jury selection the first day. (Supp.
Tr., p.7, Ls.1-5.) Calvillo was also present in court on the second day of trial
during the opening statements by the attorneys and the presentation of the
state's witnesses, including the victim.

(Tr., pA5, Ls.10-14.)

However, the

morning of the third day of trial, Calvillo's attorney advised the court Calvillo was
not present because he was ill.

(Tr., p.259, L.8 - p.260, L.14.)

The court

ultimately released the jury for the day and afforded Calvillo the opportunity to
return to court the next morning to continue his trial. (Tr., p.287, LA - p. 288,
L.11.)
Calvillo again failed to appear for his fourth day of trial, although he had
made a brief appearance outside the courthouse the previous day to speak with
his attorney. (Tr., p.304, L.8 - p.307, L.19.) Given Calvillo's continued absence
and the lack of an explanation for it, the court proceeded with trial in Calvillo's
absence. (Tr., p.311, L.15 - p.317, L.13.) Counsel for Calvillo rested his case
(Tr., p.324, Ls.21-22) and ultimately waived his right to give a closing argument
(Supp. Tr., p.318, LsA-5).
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In his absence, the jury found Calvillo guilty of seven counts of lewd
conduct with a minor and one count of sexual abuse of a minor.1 (R., pp.247250.) Calvillo was ultimately discovered incarcerated in San Diego. (R., pp.254260.)

Upon his return to Idaho, Calvillo filed a motion for a new trial.

pp.300-306.)

(R.,

The court denied his motion for a new trial, finding Calvillo "was

voluntarily absent from his trial after having attended for two full days."

(R.,

p.402.)
The court sentenced Calvillo to concurrent 30 year unified sentences with
the first 15 years fixed on each lewd conduct conviction, as well as 15 years fixed
for sexual abuse of a minor.

(R., pp.433-435.) Calvillo timely appealed.

(R.,

pp.471-475.)

The court had previously granted Calvillo's Rule 29 motion as to count nine,
sexual abuse of a minor, (Tr., p.284, L.9 - p.285, L. 7) and the jury was unable to
reach a unanimous verdict on the lewd conduct charge in count three (R., p.248).
1
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ISSUE
Calvillo states the issue on appeal as:
Did the prosecutor commit misconduct during closing
arguments, rising to the level of a fundamental error, when the
prosecutor indirectly commented on Mr. Calvillo's right to remain
silent by repeatedly referencing C.v.'s testimony at trial as
"uncontroverted"?
(Appellant's brief, p.6.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Calvillo failed to show that his claim of prosecutorial misconduct
constitutes fundamental error?
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ARGUMENT
Calvillo Has Failed To Show That His Claim Of Prosecutorial Misconduct
Constitutes Fundamental Error

A.

Introduction
For the first time on appeal, Calvillo claims that closing argument remarks

made by the prosecutor at his criminal trial constituted prosecutorial misconduct
of such an egregious nature that he is entitled a reversal of his conviction and
sentence. (Appellant's brief, pp.7-14.) Calvillo failed to raise this issue below.
Since this issue was not preserved for appeal, to prevail Calvillo must
demonstrate that not only do the comments constitute prosecutorial misconduct,
but that misconduct constitutes fundamental error. Calvillo has failed to meet this
burden, and his appeal must therefore be denied.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Generally Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved

for appeal through an objection at triaL" State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245
P.3d 961, 976 (2010) (citations omitted). Where a claim is raised for the first time
on appeal, the appellate court will consider whether the error alleged qualifies as
fundamental error. kL at 980.

C.

Calvillo Has Failed To Establish Reversible Error In Relation To The
Prosecutor's Closing Argument
The Fifth Amendment guarantees "[n]o person ... shall be compelled in

any criminal case to be a witness against himself... " U.S. Const. amend. V.
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Therefore, a prosecutor may not urge the jury to draw on inference of guilt from
defendant's failure to testify at trial. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
Calvillo contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct and violated his
Fifth Amendment right during her closing argument by referring to certain
evidence as "uncontroverted" on several occasions. (Appellant's brief, pp.7-14.)
There was no objection to the comments at trial. The statements complained of
by Calvillo are as follows:
And what you have heard from [C.V.] was uncontroverted evidence
that proves every one of these counts beyond a reasonable doubt.
You've heard uncontroverted evidence from [CV.] what this
defendant did, and what he did was sexual abuse of a child.
That's the uncontroverted evidence of what that defendant did to
her in the front seat of the car at that park, and that's for Count X,
Instruction 28.
That uncontroverted
reasonable doubt.

evidence

proves

this

case

beyond

a

... if you can recall that testimony, which has been uncontroverted,
which proves the defendant committed this crime.
That uncontroverted evidence, which is entirely believable, after
you watched her testify and say what she said during this trial, that
proves this case, that count, beyond reasonable doubt.
(Appellant's brief, p.12 (citations to Supp. Tr. omitted).)
Under the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in Perry, unobjected to claims of
constitutional error are reviewed using a three-part test:
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the
defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated, (2) the
error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error
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affected the defendant's sUbstantial rights meaning (in most
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial
proceedings.
150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.
Application of the foregoing standard to Calvillo's claim of error
demonstrates he has failed to satisfy any of the three prongs of the Perry
analysis, and has thus failed to meet his burden of establishing he is entitled to
reversal of his conviction.
1.

Calvillo Has Failed To Demonstrate That One Or More Of His
Unwaived Constitutional Rights Were Violated

Calvillo claims the "prosecutor's repeated and gratuitous references to [the
victim's] testimony as 'uncontroverted' constitute an impermissible comment on
[his] right to remain silent at triaL" (Appellant's brief, p.8.)

However, a review of

the applicable law and the context of the statements made during closing
argument reveals that Calvillo is not entitled to a presumption of invocation of the
right to testify where he absconded rather than simply declined to testify at trial.
"The Fifth Amendment guarantee that no person may be compelled in a
criminal case to be a witness against himself is violated if a prosecutor comments
upon a defendant's failure to testify at triaL" State v. Jackson, 151 Idaho 376,
382, 256 P.3d 784, 790 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609,
614 (1965); State v. McMurry, 143 Idaho 312,314, 143 P.3d 400,402 (Ct. App.
2006). "The rule set forth in Griffin applies to direct and indirect comments on the
failure to testify." State v. McMurry, 143 Idaho 312,314, 143 P.3d 400,402 (Ct.
App. 2006) (citations ';omitted).

Generally, the right to silence is not self-

executing, but must be invoked. See State v. Perez, 145 Idaho 383, 387, 179
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P.3d 346, 350 (Ct. App. 2008) ("A suspect's invocation of the right to remain
silent also must be clear and unequivocal." (citations omitted)). The exception to
this, however, occurs at trial where no affirmative invocation of the right to remain
silent is required. See Griffin, 380 U.S. at 609-15. In this instant case, however,
the trial exception to the requirement that an invocation of the right to remain
silent did not apply because Calvillo's trial counsel promised the jury in opening
statement that Calvillo would be testifying.

Instead, Calvillo absconded before

telling his side of the story.
Although it is clear Calvillo was well aware of his right to testify. his failure
to testify was based on his flight to Mexico to avoid taking the stand instead of
from his voluntary election not to testify pursuant to his right to remain silent. In
fact. until the night before the final day of trial. Calvillo had been actively
preparing to take the stand.
In concluding Calvillo "was voluntarily absent from his trial after having
attended for two full days" (R., pA02). the trial court found Calvillo had faked an
illness in order to stop his trial and get a new attorney:
No proof of Calvillo having been treated for medical
conditions was provided at [the] time [of trial]. nor was such proof
ever provided. Indeed, given Castillo's testimony before this court
during evidentiary hearing. it is clear that Calvillo was never treated
by any medical personnel that day; he was never in the emergency
room. and the he was feigning such illness for an illicit motive to
prepare his getaway. He was a persuasive actor in this regard even cor;lVincing his seasoned defense counsel of his supposed ill
health.
(R., pp.387-388.)

Calvillo watched the presentation of the state's case and

subsequently met with his attorney to prepare for his testimony the night before
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Calvillo fled to Mexico. (R., p.382.) His counsel believed "that Calvillo was going
to be a good witness." Calvillo, however, apparently decided his own testimony
would not be sufficient to overcome the assertions made by his victim and
claimed upon his return to Idaho that he was not pleased with his counsel's
performance:
... in the affidavit, Calvillo contends that on November 18,
2011 [sic], the day he was expected to testify, he was "very upset
about [his attorney's] preparation of the case." He felt that [his
attorney's] performance was "poor and he would get convicted
without the jury ever hearing [the] defendant's evidence." He
further averred that he wanted to "stop the trial and get a new
attorney."
Calvillo further "understood" that the trial could stop if there
was a "big" problem, and that he could get a new trial with a
different lawyer. The source of his "understanding" was never
explained to the court.
In paragraph 7 of his affidavit, [Calvillo] states: "in light of
that belief, [Calvillo] told his attorney that he was too sick to come
to Court on the last day the defendant was in court. [His attorney]
told [Calvillo] to be in Court at 11 :00 a.m. on the 18th of November,
2010.
(R., pp.389-390 (citations to the referenced affidavit omitted).)

After disappearing before his trial was over, "Calvillo remained at large
until his arrest in California, after he had been returned from Mexico by his
bonding company." (R., p.389.) In concluding "Calvillo's absence was voluntary"
(R., pA01), the trial court found "Calvillo was to testify for his life, and instead he

chose to leave, playing 'fast and loose' with the court" (R., p.391).

Because

Calvillo fled instead of remaining for the final day of his jury trial, he is not entitled
to the presumption of invocation of his right to remain silent at trial.
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Because Calvillo has not established the violation of one or more of his
unwaived constitutional rights, he has failed to meet the first prong of the Perry
fundamental error analysis.

2.

Calvillo Has Failed To Show That Any Alleged Error Was Clear Or
Obvious, Or That The Failure To Object Was Not A Tactical
Decision

For the reasons discussed above, Calvillo cannot show any Fifth
Amendment violation, let alon~ any violation which was "clear or obvious."
Calvillo cannot show that the jury interpreted the prosecutor's statements in
closing argument as indirectly commenting on his right to silence.
Further, Calvillo also cannot show that his trial counsel's decision not to
object during the closing argument was based on ignorance of the law or other
objective shortcomings, as opposed to being merely a tactical decision. Calvillo's
counsel was clearly aware of and sensitive to the issue of Calvillo's voluntary
decision not to return to his trial and testify following the declaration to the jury
that he would in fact tell his side of the story, and not ignorant to Calvillo's Fifth
Amendment rights.
Calvillo has failed to show that any alleged error was "clear or obvious," or
that his trial counsel's decision not to object to the prosecutor's rebuttal was
based on any ignorance of the law or objective shortcomings.

Calvillo has

therefore failed to meet the second prong of the fundamental error analysis.
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3.

Calvillo Has Failed To Demonstrate That Any Alleged Error
Affected The Outcome Of The Trial Proceedings

Misconduct by a prosecutor is fundamental only if the alleged misconduct
is so egregious or inflammatory that any prejudice arising from it was not, or
could not have been, remedied by a ruling from the trial court informing the jury
that it should be disregarded. State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 785-786, 948 P.2d
127, 140-141 (1997); State v. Smith, 117 Idaho 891,898,792 P.2d 916, 923
(1990); State v. Missamore, 114 Idaho 879, 761 P.2d 1231 (Ct. App. 1988); State
v. Ames, 109 Idaho 373, 707 P.2d 484 (Ct. App. 1985).

In this case, even

assuming that the prosecutor committed misconduct by indirectly referencing the
fact that Calvillo did not testify, an objection and curative instruction made after
the prosecutor's first reference to "uncontroverted" evidence would have easily
remedied any potential for the jury to make inappropriate inferences from the
comments, and would have prevented subsequent use of terms such as
"uncontroverted."
The district court clearly instructed the jury that it was not to draw any
inference of guilt from the fact that Calvillo did not testify at trial. (R., p.223.) A
jury should not be assumed to have utterly disregarded a direct instruction not to
make such a negative inference, and instead be assumed to have been so
influenced by a prosecutor's possible indirect reference to a defendant's silence
as to disregard those specific a:,d direct instructions. State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho
747, 751, 947 P.2d 420, 424 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Hudson, 129 Idaho 478,
481, 927 P.2d 451,454 (Ct. App. 1996) (An appellate court presumes that the
jury followed the district court's instructions.).
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Calvillo, who must satisfy all three prongs of the Perry fundamental error
analysis, has failed to meet any of them.

He has therefore failed to show

fundamental error in the prosecutor's rebuttal closing argument.

4.

Any Misconduct By The Prosecutor In Closing Argument
Was Harmless In Light Of Calvillo's Flight To Mexico During
Trial

Were this Court to determine the statements by the prosecutor in closing
argument regarding the uncontroverted nature of the victim's testimony that only
Calvillo could have contradicted were prosecutorial misconduct amounting to
fundamental error, any error is harmless in light of Calvillo's flight to Mexico.
"Error is not reversible, however, unless it is prejudicial."

State v.

Whitaker, 152 Idaho 945, 951, 277 P.3d 392, 398 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing State v.
Stoddard, 105 Idaho 169, 171,667 P.2d 272, 274 (Ct. App. 1983)). "With limited
exceptions, even constitutional error may be harmless."

kL

Here, if Calvillo were

allowed a retrial, it would include the testimony of his victim as to the many
instances of sexual contact. Additionally, a jury would hear that after listening to
his victim's testimony, Calvillo decided to flee to Mexico to avoid further
prosecution instead of taking the stand and telling his side of the story as he
indicated at the beginning of trial he would do.

This added evidence of

consciousness of guilt greatly increases the strength of the case against Calvillo.
Against that backdrop, it could be concluded beyond reasonable doubt that any
impermissible comments by the prosecutor would not contribute to a jury verdict
of guilty.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Calvillo's judgment of
conviction and sentence.
DATED this 16th day of October, 20
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